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Abstract
In the present paper we consider the allocation of costs in connection networks. Agents
have connection demands in form of pairs of locations they want to have connected.
Connections between locations are costly to build. The problem is to allocate costs
of networks satisfying all connection demands. We use a few axioms to character-
ize allocation rules that truthfully implement cost minimizing networks satisfying all
connection demands in a game where: (1) a central planner announces an allocation
rule and a cost estimation rule; (2) every agent reports her own connection demand as
well as all connection costs; (3) the central planner selects a cost minimizing network
satisfying reported connection demands based on the estimated costs; and, (4) the plan-
ner allocates the true costs of the selected network. It turns out that an allocation rule
satisfies the axioms if and only if relative cost shares are fixed.
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1 Introduction
Overview of the paper: In the present paper we consider cost allocation in the connection
network (CN) model used in Anshelevich et al. (2008), Chen et al. (2010), Juarez & Ku-
mar (2013) and Moulin (2014). There are finite sets of locations and agents. Agents have
connection demands in form of pairs of locations they want to have directly or indirectly
connected. Connections between locations are costly, undirected and free from congestion.
Consequently, several agents can use the same connection as part of paths satisfying their
connection demands. Therefore connections are public goods. The CN model has broad
empirical relevance as illustrated in Section 6 where we discuss the German Hansa as an
example of network building and cost allocation in practice.
A minimum cost connection network (MCCN) is a network minimizing total cost subject
to the constraint that all connection demands have to be satisfied. An allocation rule maps
MCCNs, connection demands and connection costs to cost shares for all agents. Depending
on the allocation rule there can be a potential conflict between overall welfare aimed at
minimizing total cost and individual welfare aimed at minimizing individual cost shares.
We characterize the set of allocation rules that truthfully implement MCCNs.
Two properties are at heart of our characterization: Unobserved Information Indepen-
dence (UII); and, Network Independence (NI). UII states that connection costs of unused
connections should not influence cost shares. Two versions of UII are considered: UII for
comparison of situations with the same set of locations and Strong UII (SUII) for compari-
son of situations with different sets of locations. NI states that cost shares should not depend
on the selected MCCN in case of multiple MCCNs. In addition, Scale Invariance (SI) stat-
ing that cost shares are homogeneous of degree one in connection costs is considered. We
characterize allocation rules satisfying UII or SUII and NI (Theorem 1 and Corollary 1) as
well as UII or SUII, NI and SI (Corollaries 2 and 3).
The difference between UII and SUII is small. However, whether we use UII or SUII
has some impact on the domain as well as the form of allocation rules. With UII we have to
focus on connection networks with undemanded locations and allocation rules can depend
on the sets of locations. With SUII we can consider all CNs and allocation rules cannot
depend on the sets of locations.
In Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 we show that an allocation rule satisfies UII or SUII and
NI if and only if cost shares depend on connection demands, total cost, the set of locations in
case of UII, and nothing else. In Corollaries 2 and 3 we show that an allocation rule satisfies
UII or SUII, NI and SI if and only if relative cost shares depend on connection demands,
the set of locations in case of UII, and nothing else. Theorem 1 implies UII and NI are
at odds with Individual Rationality where Individual Rationality means that no agent pays
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more than the cost of building a path satisfying her own connection demand.
In order to consider truthful implementation of MCCNs in the CN model we consider a
variation of the game introduced in Hougaard & Tvede (2012) where a planner is ignorant
of connection demands and connection costs:
(1) A planner announces a cost allocation rule and a cost estimation rule.
(2) Every agent reports her connection demand and all connection costs.
(3) The planner selects a MCCN based on reported connection demands and estimated
connection costs.
(4) The planner allocates the true costs of the selected network.
Agents connection cost reports are used by the planner to estimate connection costs. The
planner selects a MCCN based on estimated connection costs. True connection costs for
connections in the selected MCCN are observed. The planner allocates the true costs of
the selected network. Agents can misreport connection costs. However misreporting is not
revealed for connections not in the selected MCCN.
We show that if an allocation rule truthfully implement MCCNs, then it satisfies UII
and NI (Observations 1 and 2); and, we characterize allocation rules satisfying UII and NI
as well as UII, NI and SI that truthfully implements MCCNs (Theorem 2 and Corollary
4). Consequently, voluntary participation – even in the weak form of Individual Rational-
ity – is at odds with truthful implemention of MCCNs. Therefore economic efficiency can
be attained if and only if the planner is able to prevent agents from building their own net-
works. Moreover, in Theorem 3 we address the issue of how the planner being less ignorant,
knowing either connection demands or connection costs, influences the set of networks that
can be implemented. Finally, we extend the characterization of allocation rules satisfying
UII, NI and SI and truthfully implementing MCCNs to the case of incomplete information
(Corollary 5).
In the minimum cost spanning tree (MCST) model one location is a source and every
other location is inhabited by an agent. Every agent wants to be connected to the source
making the MCST model a special case of the CN model. For the MCST model it has been
shown (Hougaard and Tvede, 2012) that the set of allocation rules satisfying reductionism (a
strong form of UII) and monotonicity (a strong form of NI) contains fixed relative cost share
rules such as the equal split rule, the folk rule discussed in Bogomolnaia & Moulin (2010)
and the rest of the family of obligation rules introduced and analyzed in Tijs et al. (2006).
The family of obligation rules are Stand Alone core stable where Stand alone core stable
means that no coalition of agents pays more than the cost of building a network satisfying
the connection demands of its members. Hence UII and NI are compatible with Stand Alone
core stability in the MCST model. In contrast, UII and NI are incompatible with Individual
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Rationality in the CN model as mentioned above.
Related literature: Implementation in the CN model has been analyzed in Anshelevich et al.
(2008), Chen et al. (2010) and Juarez & Kumar (2013). The same game is used in all three
papers:
(1) A central planner announces a cost allocation rule.
(2) Every agent reports a path between the pair of locations she wants to be connected.
(3) The central planner selects the network consisting of all reported paths and allocates
costs of the selected network.
In comparison with our game, every agent has less impact on the network selection, because
the paths reported by the other agents are parts of the selected network. The planner has
more information than in our game, because the planner knows connection demands and
connection costs. In Anshelevich et al. (2008) and Chen et al. (2010) properties of the con-
nectionwise equal split rule (the cost of every connection is divided equally between agents
whose reported paths include the connection) are studied. It is shown that: Nash equilibria
exist; all Nash equilibria can be inefficient; and, there are bounds on the ratios between the
cost of the cheapest Nash equilibrium and the cost of a MCCN (price of stability) and the
cost of the most expensive Nash equilibrium and the cost of a MCCN (price of anarchy). In
Juarez & Kumar (2013) attention is restricted to the set of allocation rules that depend on
costs of reported paths, total cost and nothing else. It is shown that the set of allocation rules
implementing MCCNs and the set of fixed relative cost shares rules are identical. In com-
parison with the present paper a much smaller set of allocation rules is considered. Since
attention is restricted to allocation rules that do not depend on connection demands, our
Corollary 2 implies that the only allocation rules satisfying UII, NI and SI are fixed relative
cost shares rules.
Implementation in the MCST model has been analyzed in Bergantinos & Lorenzo (2004,
2005), Bergantinos & Vidal-Puga (2010) and Hougaard & Tvede (2012). In all four pa-
pers existence of Nash equilibria and their properties are considered. In comparison with
Hougaard and Tvede (2012), the present paper illustrates the drastic consequences of going
from the MCST model to the more general CN model. It was shown in Megiddo (1978)
and Tamir (1991) that the set of Stand Alone core stable allocations can be empty for the
MCST model (and therefore also the CN model) with undemanded locations. Hence UII
and NI are trivially incompatible with Stand Alone core stability. However, the implications
of Theorems 1 and 2 are less trivial: in the CN model UII and NI as well as truthful im-
plementation are incompatible with Individual Rationality. In Moulin (2014) the folk rule
is extended from the MCST model to two subclasses of the CN model for which the set of
Stand Alone core stable allocations is nonempty.
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Plan of the paper: In Section 2 we introduce the set up and our axioms; in Section 3 we
characterize allocation rules satisfying our axioms; in Section 4 we study implementation of
MCCNs; in Section 5 we study implementation of MCCNs in case of incomplete informa-
tion; in Section 6 we discuss the German Hansa; and finally, in Section 7 we end with a few
remarks.
2 The CN model
In the present section we introduce our set up and axioms.
Set up
LetM = {1, . . . ,m} be a set of finitely many agents andL a set of possible locations with
|L | ≥ 2m+ 1. The set of possible locations L can be finite or infinite. We focus on the
allocation of costs in connection networks with finitely many locationsN selected from the
set of possible locations L . The set of connections between pairs of possible locations is
L 2 =L×L .
Every agent i ∈M has a connection demand in form of a pair of locations (ai,bi) ∈L 2
she wants to be directly or indirectly connected. A connection structure P is a collection of
individual connection demands (ai,bi)i∈M . Let P be the set of connection structures. A
cost structure C describes costs of connecting locations and is defined by a set of finitely
many locationsNC ⊂L and a map c :N 2C → R+ with
• c j j = 0 for all j.
• c jk > 0 for all j and k with j 6= k.
• ck j = c jk for all j and k.
Connections are undirected and free from congestion. For 2L being the set of subsets of
L let F ⊂P×2L be the set of connection structures P and subsets of locations N with
(ai,bi) ∈N 2 for all i. A connection problem is a connection structure and a cost structure
(P,C) with (P,NC) ∈F .
A graph g on N is a set of locations and a set of connections (V,E) with V ⊂ N
and E ⊂ V×V . A CN for a connection problem (P,C) is a graph g = (V,E) such that for
every agent i there is a path pi = (Vi,Ei) ⊂ g where Vi = {ai,r,r′, . . . ,s,s′,bi} and Ei =
{air,rr′, . . . ,ss′,s′bi}. CNs can contain cycles. Let v(g,c) be the total cost of a CN
v(g,c) = ∑
jk∈g
c jk.
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A MCCN for a connection problem (P,C) is a CN g minimizing total cost subject to the
constraint that all connection demands have to be satisfied. Therefore g is a MCCN if and
only if v(g,c)≤ v(h,c) for every CN h. The set of MCCNs is non-empty and finite because
the set of CNs is non-empty and finite. LetMCCN (P,C) be the set of MCCNs for a given
connection problem (P,C). Clearly every MCCN is either a tree or a forest (a collection of
trees). Indeed if a CN contains a cycle, then removing any connection in the cycle does not
change whether connection demands are satisfied or not. Since every MCCN g is either a
tree or a forest, for every agent i there is a unique path pi(g,P) between ai and bi.
A cost allocation problem (g,P,C) is a CN g and a connection problem (P,C) such that
g is a MCCN for (P,C). Let U be the set of cost allocation problems (g,P,C) and UU ⊂U
the set of cost allocation problems with undemanded locations so (g,P,C) ∈ UU provided
NC\∪i∈M {ai,bi} 6= /0.
Allocation of costs
For a given cost allocation problem (g,P,C) the total cost of the MCCN g has to be shared
among agents inM . An allocation rule φ :U → Rm+ maps a cost allocation problem to an
m-dimensional vector of positive cost shares,
φ(g,P,C) = (φ1(g,P,C), . . . ,φm(g,P,C)),
for which budget-balance ∑i∈M φi(g,P,C) = v(g,c) is satisfied.
Two examples of allocation rules are the Shapley value considered in Moulin (2013) and
the connectionwise equal split (also denoted the Shapley protocol) considered in Chen et al.
(2010). Additional notation is needed to define the Shapley value. Let S (i) ⊂ 2M be the
set of coalitions of agents which contain agent i and VS(C), where V/0(C) = 0, the minimum
cost for a graph for which connection demands for all agents in S ∈ 2M are satisfied. The
Shapley value is defined as follows: for all i,
φSVi (g,P,C) = ∑
S∈S (i)
(|S|−1)!(m−|S|)!
m!
(VS(C)−VS\{i}(C)).
The connectionwise equal split is defined as follows: for all i,
φCESi (g,P,C) = ∑
jk∈pi(g,P)
c jk
|{ i′ ∈M | jk ∈ pi′(g,P)}|
.
Axioms
Now we present axioms used to characterize cost allocation rules. The first three properties
are at the heart of our characterizations.
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Unobserved Information Independence (UII) For all (g,P,C),(g,P,D) ∈ U with NC =
ND and cjk = djk for all jk ∈ g, φ(g,P,C) = φ(g,P,D).
UII states that for two cost allocation problems with identical MCCNs, connection struc-
tures, sets of locations and observed connection costs, the allocations of costs should be
identical. Hence UII implies the allocation of costs is independent of costs of unobserved
connections but can depend on the set of locations.
Strong Unobserved Information Independence (SUII) For all (g,P,C),(g,P,D)∈U with
cjk = djk for all jk ∈ g, φ(g,P,C) = φ(g,P,D).
SUII states that for two cost allocation problems with identical MCCNs, connection struc-
tures and observed connection costs, the allocations of costs should be identical. Hence
SUII implies the allocation of costs is independent of costs of unobserved connections and
the set of locations. Clearly SUII implies UII.
Network Independence (NI) For all (g,P,C),(h,P,C) ∈U , φ(g,P,C) = φ(h,P,C).
NI states that for a connection problem with multiple MCCNs, the allocations of costs
should be identical for all MCCNs. Hence NI implies the allocation of costs is indepen-
dent of the chosen MCCN.
Scale Invariance (SI) For all (g,P,C) ∈U and δ > 0, φ(g,P,(NC,δc)) = δφ(g,P,C).
SI is a standard property stating that cost shares are homogeneous of degree one in connec-
tion costs.
In case of constructing a network, depending on the perception of fairness, costs of
unused connections can be allowed to have more or less influence on the allocation of the
total cost of the realized network. The position reflected in SUII as well as UII for problems
with identical sets of locations is that since the cost of a realized CN is observed and costs of
unused connections are unobserved, the allocation of costs should not depend on the costs
of unused connections. Moreover for allocation rules that allow costs of unused connections
to influence the allocation of total cost there is a conflict between agents over cost estimates
of unused connections. This conflict can be an obstacle for implementation of the efficient
network as we demonstrate below in Observation 1. All in all, SUII can be seen to reflect
a positive as well as a normative approach to cost sharing. The connectionwise equal split
rule satisfies SUII. Allocation rules violating SUII include the Shapley value.
In connection problems with several MCCNs total cost are identical for all MCCNs.
Therefore there is no reason for choosing one MCCN over another. The position reflected
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in NI is that the allocation of costs should not depend on the chosen MCCN. Moreover for
allocation rules that allow the choice of MCCN to influence the allocation of costs there is
a conflict between agents over which MCCN to choose. This conflict can be an obstacle for
implementation of the efficient network as we demonstrate below in Observation 2. All in
all, NI can be seen to reflect a positive as well as a normative approach to cost sharing. The
Shapley value satisfies NI. Allocation rules violating NI include the connectionwise equal
split rule.
For the MCST model we showed in Hougaard & Tvede (2012) that an allocation rule
truthfully implements MCCNs if and only if it is reductionist and monotonic. An allocation
rule is reductionist provided it depends on irreducible costs, where the irreducible cost of a
connection is: the true cost in case the connection is used; and, the lowest cost for which
the connection needs not be used in case the connection is unused. An allocation rule is
monotonic provided it is monotonic in irreducible costs. For the CN model irreducible costs
cannot be defined. However: an implication of reductionism is that connection costs of
unused connections do not influence cost shares as formalized in SUII; and, an implication
of monotonicity is that cost shares are independent of the selected MCCN in case of multiple
MCCNs as formalized in NI.
3 Characterization results
In the present section we characterize allocation rules satisfying UII or SUII and NI as well
as allocation rules satisfying UII or SUII, NI and SI.
Simple allocation rules
First we consider allocation rules for which cost shares depend on the connection structure
P, the set of locationsNC, the total cost v(g,c) of the MCCN g and nothing else.
Definition 1 A simple allocation rule is an allocation rule φ :U → Rm+ for which there is
a map γ :F×R++→ Rm+ such that for all cost allocation problems (g,P,C) ∈U ,
φ(g,P,C) = γ(P,NC,v(g,c)).
We use UII and NI to characterize simple allocation rules on UU .
Theorem 1 An allocation rule φ on UU satisfies UII and NI if and only if it is simple.
In Hougaard & Tvede (2012) we considered the MCST model where M = {1, . . . ,m},
N = {0, . . . ,m} and (ai,bi) = (0, i) for all i. We showed that the set of allocation rules
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satisfying UII and NI is quite large and includes the equal split rule, the folk rule and the
rest of the family of obligation rules. All allocation rules in the family of obligation rules
are Stand Alone core stable. Theorem 1 implies that adding locations not inhabited by any
agent to the MCST model shrinks the set of allocation rules dramatically. Indeed the set of
allocation rules satisfying SUII and NI contains no Individually Rational allocation rule for
the CN model with undemanded locations.
Before we provide a proof for Theorem 1 we discuss the implications of replacing UII
with SUII and adding SI to UII and NI as well as SUII and NI.
Strongly simple allocation rules
Second we consider allocation rules for which cost shares depend on the connection struc-
ture P, the total cost v(g,c) of the MCCN g and nothing else.
Definition 2 A strongly simple allocation rule is an allocation rule φ :U →Rm+ for which
there is a map λ :P×R++→ Rm+ such that for all cost allocation problems (g,P,C) ∈U ,
φ(g,P,C) = λ (P,v(g,c)).
We use SUII and NI to characterize strongly simple allocation rules on U .
Corollary 1 An allocation rule φ satisfies SUII and NI if and only if it is strongly simple.
Proof: According to Theorem 1 there is a map γ :F×R++ → Rm+ such that φ(g,P,C) =
γ(P,NC,v(g,c)) for all (g,P,C) ∈ UU because φ is satisfies UII and NI on UU . For every
pair of cost allocation problems (g,P,C) and (g,P,D) in UU with c jk = d jk for all jk ∈ g,
γ(P,NC,v(g,c))= γ(P,ND,v(g,d)) according to SUII. Hence for every connection structure
P and total cost v pick an arbitrary cost allocation problem (g,P,C)∈UU with v(g,c)= v and
let λ (P,v) be defined by λ (P,v) = γ(P,NC,v(g,c)). For a cost allocation problem (g,P,D)∈
U \UU there is a location r ∈L \ND because |ND| ≤ 2m and |L | ≥ 2m+ 1. Consider a
cost allocation problem (g,P,C) withNC =ND∪{r}, c jk = d jk for jk ∈ g and c jk = v(g,d)
for j= r and all k 6= r. Then φ(g,P,D)= φ(g,P,C)= λ (P,v(g,c))= λ (P,v(g,d)). Therefore
the allocation rule is strongly simple. 2
Linear simple allocation rules
For simple allocation rules, the allocation of costs can depend on total cost in quite weird
ways. Indeed, consider the following example: If total cost is a rational number v(g,c) ∈Q,
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then the total cost is split equally between agents
φi(g,P,C) =
v(g,c)
m
for all i and if the total cost is an irrational number v(g,c) ∈ R\Q, then the total cost is
allocated between agents such that
φi(g,P,C) =
wi
∑ j∈M w j
v(g,c)
where
wi = ∑
j∈{ai,bi}
(|{i′ | j = ai′}|+ |{i′ | j = bi′}|)
for all i. The rule obviously violates SI although each of the two parts of the rule satisfies
SI on its domain. The first part of the cost allocation rule is the equal split rule. The second
part is a rule where the cost share of agent i depends on the number of agents who have the
locations in the connection demand of agent i as parts of their connection demands.
Third we consider allocation rules for which relative cost shares depend on connection
structures P, the set of locationsNC and nothing else.
Definition 3 A linear simple allocation rule is an allocation rule φ : U → Rm+ for which
there is a map Γ :F → Rm+ such that for all cost allocation problems (g,P,C) ∈U ,
φ(g,P,C) = Γ(P,NC)v(g,c).
We use UII, NI and SI to characterize linear simple allocation rules on UU .
Corollary 2 An allocation rule φ on UU satisfies UII, NI and SI if and only if it is linear
simple.
Proof: We leave it to the reader to check that linear simple allocation rules satisfy UII, NI
and SI. Consequently we focus on the converse claim.
According to Theorem 1 if an allocation rule φ : UU → Rm+ satisfies UII and NI, then
there is a map γ :F×R++→Rm+ such that for all (g,P,C)∈UU, φ(g,P,C)= γ(P,NC,v(g,c)).
For all (g,P,C)∈UU and δ > 0, v(g,δc) = δv(g,c). Consider two cost allocations problems
(g,P,C),(h,P,D) ∈UU withNC =ND and v(g,c) = δv(h,d) for some δ > 0. Then
φ(g,P,C) = γ(P,NC,v(g,c)) = γ(P,NC,δv(h,d)) = γ(P,ND,v(h,δd)) = φ(h,P,(ND,δd))
If the allocation rule satisfies SI, then φ(h,P,(ND,δd)) = δφ(h,P,D). Therefore the rela-
tive cost shares are independent of the MCCN and the cost structure
1
v(g,c)
φ(g,P,C) =
1
δv(h,d)
δφ(h,P,D) =
1
v(h,d)
φ(h,P,D).
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Hence for every connection structure P ∈ P pick an arbitrary cost allocation problem
(h,P,D) ∈UU and let Γ(P,ND) be defined by
Γ(P,ND) =
1
v(h,d)
φ(h,P,D).
Then for all (g,P,C) ∈UU, φ(g,P,C) = Γ(P,NC)v(g,c). Thus the allocation rule is linear
simple. 2
Linear strongly simple allocation rules
Fourth we consider allocation rules for which relative cost shares depend on connection
structures P and nothing else.
Definition 4 A linear strongly simple allocation rule is an allocation rule φ :U →Rm+ for
which there is a map Λ :P → Rm+ such that for all cost allocation problems (g,P,C) ∈U ,
φ(g,P,C) = Λ(P)v(g,c).
We use SUII, NI and SI to characterize linear strongly simple allocation rules on U .
Corollary 3 An allocation rule φ satisfies SUII, NI and SI if and only if it is linear strongly
simple.
Proof: We leave it to the reader to check that linear strongly simple allocation rules satisfy
SUII, NI and SI. Consequently we focus on the converse claim.
According to Corollary 1 if an allocation rule φ : U → Rm+ satisfies SUII and NI, then
there is a map λ :P×R++→ Rm+ such that for all (g,P,C) ∈U , φ(g,P,C) = λ (P,v(g,c)).
For all (g,P,C) ∈U and δ > 0, v(g,δc) = δv(g,c). Consider two cost allocations problems
(g,P,C),(h,P,D) ∈U with v(g,c) = δv(h,d) for some δ > 0. Then
φ(g,P,C) = λ (P,v(g,c)) = λ (P,δv(h,d)) = λ (P,v(h,δd)) = φ(h,P,ND,δd))
If the allocation rule satisfies SI, then φ(h,P,(ND,δd)) = δφ(h,P,D). Therefore the rela-
tive cost shares are independent of the MCCN and the cost structure
1
v(g,c)
φ(g,P,C) =
1
δv(h,c)
δφ(h,P,D) =
1
v(h,d)
φ(h,P,D).
Hence for every connection structure P ∈ P pick an arbitrary cost allocation problem
(h,P,D) ∈U and let Λ(P) be defined by
Λ(P) =
1
v(h,d)
φ(h,P,D).
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Then for all (g,P,C) ∈ U , φ(g,P,C) = Λ(P)v(g,c). Thus the allocation rule is linear
strongly simple. 2
For linear strongly simple allocation rules, the allocation of costs is strongly simple and
homogenous of degree one in connection costs. Consequently linear strongly simple rules
are continuous in cost structures.
Proof of Theorem 1
We leave it to the reader to check that simple allocation rules on UU satisfy UII and NI.
Consequently we focus on the converse claims and consider cost allocation problems with
identical sets of locations.
The proof that allocation rules satisfying UII and NI are simple on UU consists of a
preliminary observation, three lemmas and a closing observation.
First, we make the following preliminary observation. Consider a cost allocation problem
(g,P,C) and a finite number of pairs of MCCNs and cost structures (g1,C1), . . . ,(gN ,CN)
such that
g,g1 ∈MCCN (P,C1) and c1jk = c jk for all jk ∈ g.
g1,g2 ∈MCCN (P,C2) and c2jk = c1jk for all jk ∈ g1.
...
gN−1,gN ∈MCCN (P,CN) and cNjk = cN−1jk for all jk ∈ gN−1.
Then φ(gN ,P,CN) = φ(g,P,C) according to UII and NI.
Lemma 1 Consider a cost allocation problem (g,P,C). Suppose that there is a location
u with u ∈ N and u /∈ g. Then for every pair of connections rs and st in g and all cost
structures C′ with c′rs+c′st = crs+cst , c′jk = c jk for all other connections in g and c
′
jk = v(g,c)
for all other connections, φ(g,P,C) = φ(g,P,C′).
Proof: Without loss of generality assume that c′rs < crs and c′st > cst .
In case removing rs and st from g and adding rt to g result in a graph, which is a CN consider
the following three steps.
Step 1: Define g1 by g1 = g and define C1 by
c1jk =
{
c jk for jk ∈ g
v(g,c) for all other connections.
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Then g1 ∈MCCN (P,C1) and c1jk = c jk for all jk ∈ g1. Therefore φ(g1,P,C1) = φ(g,P,C)
according to UII.
Step 2: Define g2 by removing rs and st from g1 and adding rt. Then g2 is a CN. Define C2
by
c2jk =
 c
1
rs+ c
1
st for jk = rt
c1jk for all other connections.
Then g1,g2 ∈MCCN (P,C2) and c2jk = c1jk for all jk∈ g1. Therefore φ(g2,P,C2)= φ(g1,P,C1)
according to UII and NI.
Step 3: Define g3 by removing rt from g2 and adding rs and st to g2. Then g3 is a CN.
Indeed g3 = g1. Define C3 by
c3jk =

c′rs for jk = rs
c′st for jk = st
c2jk for all other connections.
Then g2,g3 ∈MCCN (P,C3) and c3jk = c2jk for all jk∈ g2. Therefore φ(g3,P,C3)= φ(g2,P,C2)
according to UII and NI. Moreover c3rs = c
′
rs and c
3
st = c
′
st .
In case removing rs and st from g and adding rt to g result in a graph, which is not a CN,
consider the following four steps.
Step 1: Define g1 by g1 = g and define C1 by
c1jk =
{
c jk for jk ∈ g
v(g,c) for all other connections.
Then g,g1 ∈MCCN (P,C1) and c1jk = c jk for all jk ∈ g. Therefore φ(g1,P,C1) = φ(g,P,C)
according to UII.
Step 2: Define g2 by removing rs and st from g1 and adding ru, su and tu to g1. Then g2 is
a CN. Define C2 by
c2jk =

max{c′rs,c1rs− c1st} for jk = ru
c1rs−max{c′rs,c1rs− c1st} for jk = su
c1st for jk = tu
c1jk for all other connections.
Then g1,g2 ∈MCCN (P,C2) and c2jk = c1jk for all jk∈ g1. Therefore φ(g2,P,C2)= φ(g1,P,C1)
according to UII and NI.
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Step 3: Define g3 by removing ru, su and tu from g2 and adding rs and st to g2. Then g3 is
a CN. Indeed g3 = g1. Define C3 by
c3jk =

c2ru for jk = rs
c2su+ c
2
tu for jk = st
c2jk for all other connections.
Then g2,g3 ∈MCCN (P,C3) and c3jk = c2jk for all jk∈ g1. Therefore φ(g3,P,C3)= φ(g2,P,C2)
according to UII and NI. Moreover c3rs < c
1
rs and c
3
st > c
1
st .
Step 4: Repeat steps 2 and 3 until the c3rs = c
′
rs and c
3
st = c
′
st . 2
Lemma 2 Consider a cost allocation problem (g,P,C). For every pair of connections rs
and r′s′ in g, where there is no path between r and r′ in g, and all cost structures C′ with
c′rs+ c′r′s′ = crs+ cr′s′ and c
′
jk = c jk for all other connections, φ(g,P,C) = φ(g,P,C
′).
Proof: Without loss of generality assume that c′rs < crs and c′r′s′ > cr′s′ .
Step 1: Define g1 by g1 = g and define C1 by
c1jk =
{
c jk for jk ∈ g
v(g,c) for all other connections.
Then g,g1 ∈MCCN (P,C1) and c1jk = c jk for all jk ∈ g. Therefore φ(g1,P,C1) = φ(g,P,C)
according to UII.
Step 2: Define g2 by removing rs and r′s′ from g1 and adding rr′, r′s and ss′ to g1. Then g2
is a CN. Define C2 by
c2jk =

max{c′rs,
c1rs
2
} for jk = rr′
c1rs−max{c′rs,
c1rs
2
} for jk = r′s
cr′s′ for jk = ss′
c1jk for all other connections.
Then g1,g2 ∈MCCN (P,C2) and c2jk = c1jk for all jk∈ g1. Therefore φ(g2,P,C2)= φ(g1,P,C1)
according to UII and NI.
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Step 3: Defined g3 by removing rr′, r′s and ss′ from g2 and adding rs and r′s′ to g2, so
g3 = g. Define C3 by
c3jk =

c2rr′ for jk = rs
c2r′s+ css′ for jk = r
′s′
c2jk for all other connections.
Then g2,g3 ∈MCCN (P,C3) and c3jk = c2jk for all jk∈ g1. Therefore φ(g3,P,C3)= φ(g2,P,C2)
according to UII and NI.
Step 4: Repeat steps 2 and 3 until the c3rs = c
′
rs and c
3
r′s′ = c
′
r′s′ . 2
Lemma 3 Consider two cost allocation problems (g,P,C) and (h,P,D)with v(g,c)= v(h,d).
Then φ(g,P,C) = φ(h,P,D).
Proof: First the cost allocation problem (g,P,C) is transformed into (g2,P,C2)with φ(g2,P,C2)=
φ(g,P,C) such that there is a location u with u /∈ g2. Consider the following two steps.
Step 1: Define g1 by g1 = g and define C1 by
c1jk =
{
c jk for jk ∈ g
v(g,c) for all other connections.
Then g1 ∈MCCN (P,C1) and c1jk = c jk for all jk ∈ g. Therefore φ(g1,P,C1) = φ(g,P,C)
according to UII.
Step 2: Define g2 by removing ru and su from g1 and adding rs to g1 as well as replacing all
other connections to u in g1 with connections to r. Then g2 is a CN. Define C2 by
c2jk =

c1ru+ c
1
su for jk = rs
c1ju for all j with ju ∈ g and k = r
c1jk for all other connections.
Then g1,g2 ∈MCCN (P,C2) and c2jk = c1jk for all jk∈ g1. Therefore φ(g2,P,C2)= φ(g1,P,C1)
according to UII and NI.
Let M be a subset ofM such that
• If h is a CN for (ai,bi)i∈M, then h is a CN for P.
• For all i ∈M there exists a CN h for (ai′,bi′)i′∈M\{i} such that h is not a CN for P.
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Second (g2,P,C2) is transformed into (g˜,P,C˜) with φ(g˜,P,C˜) = φ(g2,P,C2) such that g˜ =
∪i∈M{ai,bi} and C˜ is arbitrary with ∑i∈M c˜aibi = v(g,c) and c˜ jk = v(g,c) for all other con-
nections. Consider the following three steps.
Step 3: Pick i ∈ M with aibi /∈ g2. Then there exists a connection j′k′ in the path pi(g2)
between ai and bi such that j′k′ /∈ {(ai′,bi′)i′∈M}. Apply Lemma 1 to move connection costs
in the path pi(g2) such that c j′k′ ≥ ∑ jk∈pi(g2)\ j′k′ c jk. Define h by removing j′k′ from g2 and
adding aibi to g2. Define g3 by removing all connections in h\∪i′∈M pi′(h) from h. Define
C3 by
c3jk =

c2j′k′+ ∑
j′′k′′∈h\∪i′∈M pi′(h)
c2j′′k′′ for jk = aibi
c2jk for all other connections.
Then g2,g3 ∈MCCN (P,C3) and c3jk = c2jk for all jk∈ g2. Therefore φ(g3,P,C3)= φ(g2,P,C2)
according to UII and NI.
Step 4: Repeat step 3 until aibi ∈ g3 for all i ∈M so g3 = ∪i∈M{ai,bi}.
Step 5: Apply Lemmas 1 and 2 to move cost to an arbitrary C˜ with ∑i∈M c˜aibi = v(g,c) and
c˜ jk = v(g,c) for all other connections. Then g˜ ∈MCCN (P,C˜) for g˜ = g3 and φ(g˜,P,C˜) =
φ(g3,P,C3).
All in all φ(g,P,C) = φ(g˜,P,C˜) = φ(h,P,D). 2
We conclude the proof of Theorem 1 for cost allocation problems inUU with the follow-
ing observation: according to Lemma 3 the allocation of costs depends on the connection
structure P, the set of locations and the total cost of the MCCN v(g,c) and no other feature
of the cost allocation problem (g,P,C). Therefore the allocation rule is simple.
4 Implementation
In the present section we consider a network formation game with m agents and a central
planner. All the agents and the planner know the set of finitely many locations N ⊂ L
with |N | ≥ 3 to ensure some connections are unused. The agents have private information
about their connection demands and know all connection costs. The planner is ignorant, so
the planner has to estimate connection costs based on connection costs reported by agents.
Therefore the rules of the game will consist of an allocation rule and a cost estimation
rule τ : Rm++ → R++ that for every connection jk maps collections of m individual cost
reports (σ jk1 , . . . ,σ
jk
m ) to estimated connection costs cejk = τ(σ
jk
1 , . . . ,σ
jk
m ). The agents need
to ensure that their individual connection demands are satisfied and want to minimize their
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individual cost shares. The planner wants to minimize total cost subject to the constraint
that all connection demands are satisfied.
The game
The network formation game has four stages:
(1) A planner announces a cost allocation rule and a cost estimation rule.
(2) Every agent reports her connection demand and all connection costs.
(3) The planner selects a MCCN based on reported connection demands and estimated
connection costs.
(4) The planner allocates true costs of the selected network.
The connection cost reports of the agents are used by the planner to estimate the cost struc-
tures. Agents can misreport both their individual connection demands (ai,bi) and the cost
structure C. Misreporting influences the estimates of connection demands and costs. Per-
ceived connection demands and estimated connection costs influence the selection of MC-
CNs. However, true costs rather than estimated costs of the selected MCCN are observed.
Therefore true costs rather than estimated costs of the selected MCCN are allocated among
agents. Hence misreporting has an indirect influence rather than direct influence on cost
shares.
Since the planner selects a MCCN based on estimated connection costs, the selected net-
work need not be a MCCN for the true connection costs. Therefore the set of cost allocation
problems has to be extended and cost allocation rules have to be defined on the extended set
of cost allocation problems: (1) a cost allocation problem (g,P,C) is a CN g and a connec-
tion problem (P,C) such that g contains no redundant connections; (2) V is the set of cost
allocation problems; and, (3) Φ : V → Rm+ with ∑i∈M Φi(g,P,C) = v(g,c) is an allocation
rule. Note U ⊂ V and Φ|U is an allocation rule on U .
Formally, the rules of the game consist of an allocation rule Φ and a connection cost
estimation rule τ :Rm++→R++. Let σ = (σ1, . . . ,σm), where σi = (σ jki ) jk∈N 2 for all i with
σ jki > 0 and σ
jk
i = σ
k j
i for all j 6= k and σ jki = 0 for all j = k, be a collection of individual
cost reports. The connection cost estimation rule is supposed to take values between the
minimum and maximum reported costs
τ(σ jk1 , . . . ,σ
jk
m ) ∈ [mini{σ jki },maxi{σ jki } ].
An connection cost estimation rule is sensitive provided
τ(µ jki ,σ
jk
−i) > τ(ν
jk
i ,σ
jk
−i)
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for all µ jki and ν
jk
i with µ
jk
i > ν
jk
i and σ
jk
−i = (σ
jk
i′ )i′ 6=i with σ
jk
i′ = σ
jk
i′′ for all i
′, i′′ 6= i. An
estimation rule is unbounded provided for every i and all σ jk−i,
lim
σ jki →0
τ(σ jki ,σ
jk
−i) = 0 and lim
σ jki →∞
τ(σ jki ,σ
jk
−i) = ∞.
The geometric average is sensitive and unbounded. Estimation rules like the arithmetic and
geometric averages as well as nontrivial convex combinations of the minimum report and
the maximum report are sensitive. The minimum report is not sensitive or unbounded, but
it is downward sensitive in the sense that it is sensitive for µ jki ,ν
jk
i ≤ σ jki′ for all i′ 6= i and
downward unbounded in the sense that
lim
σ jki →0
τ(σ jki ,σ
jk
−i) = 0.
The maximum report is not sensitive, but it is upward sensitive in the sense that it is sensitive
for µ jki ,ν
jk
i ≥ σ jki′ for all i′ 6= i and upward unbounded in the sense that
lim
σ jki →∞
τ(σ jki ,σ
jk
−i) = ∞
The median report is neither sensitive nor unbounded. In general with estimation rules
being neither sensitive nor unbounded individual agents are not able to influence estimates
of connection costs. Therefore all reports are equally good for every individual agent.
The payoff of every agent is minus her cost share in case her connection demand is met
and −∞ otherwise. Every agent reports her connection demand and all connection costs
si = (ωi,σi) where ωi = (αi,βi) ∈N 2. Hence the strategy set of every agent is N 2×C
where C is the set of all cost structures
C =
{
(σ jk) jk∈N 2 ∈ RN
2
+ |
σ jki > 0 and σ
jk
i = σ
k j
i for all j 6= k
σ jki = 0 for all j = k
}
.
Let ω , where ω = (ω1, . . . ,ωm) and ωi = (αi,βi) ∈N 2 for all i, be a collection of indi-
vidual reports on connection demands. Then the planner uses these reports ω as connection
demands. For a collection of individual cost reports σ the estimated connection costs are
ce(σ), where cejk(σ)= τ(σ
jk
i , . . . ,σ
jk
m ) for all jk. The planner allocates observed costs. Thus
let ρ(g,c,ce) :N 2→ R+ be defined by
ρ jk(g,c,ce) =
 c jk for all jk ∈ gcejk for all jk /∈ g.
Therefore for every network g in MCCN (ω,ce(σ)) the allocation of observed costs is
Φ(g,ω,ρ(g,c,ce(σ))). The planner randomly selects a network g in MCCN (ω,ce(σ))
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with all networks being equally likely. Hence for fixed collections of individual reports
(ω,σ) the expected allocation of costs is
EΦ(ω,c,ce(σ)) =
1
|MCCN (ω,ce(σ))| ∑g∈MCCN (ω,ce(σ))
Φ(g,ω,ρ(g,c,ce(σ))).
Agents can choose their reports strategically.
Equilibrium
The notion of equilibrium is Nash equilibrium.
Definition 5 A Nash equilibrium is a collection of individual reports (ω¯, σ¯) such that for
every agent i and all reports (ωi,σi) with pi(g) 6= /0 for all g∈MCCN (ωi, ω¯−i,ce(σi, σ¯−i)),
EΦi((ωi, ω¯−i),c,ce(σi, σ¯−i)) ≥ EΦi(ω¯,c,ce(σ¯)).
LetNE (P,C,Φ,τ) be the set of Nash equilibria.
No truth-telling without UII and NI
In the two observations below we show that if truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium, then
the allocation rule satisfies both UII and NI provided the estimation rule is continuous and
sensitive. We consider UII rather than SUII because both the agents and the planner know
the set of locations isN ,
Misreporting connection costs of unused connections influences the cost estimates of
unused connections. Moreover if an allocation rule does not satisfy UII, the cost estimates
of unused connections influence cost shares. Therefore agents can manipulate their cost
shares by misreporting provided UII is not satisfied. Furthermore misreporting need not be
revealed because true connection costs of unused connections are unobserved.
Observation 1 Suppose Φ is continuous in cost structures and τ is continuous and sensi-
tive. If truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium, then Φ satisfies UII.
Proof: Suppose a cost allocation rule Φ does not satisfy UII restricted to cost allocation
problems with N as the set of locations. Then there are a pair cost allocation problems
(g,P,C) and (g,P,D) withNC =ND =N and c jk = d jk for all jk ∈ g and an agent i such
that Φi(g,P,C) 6=Φi(g,P,D). For all ε > 0 define two other cost structures C1 and D1 by
c1jk =
{
c jk for jk ∈ g
c jk + ε for all other connections
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and
d1jk =
{
d jk for jk ∈ g
d jk + ε for all other connections.
Then g is the unique MCCN for connection problems (P,C1) and (P,D1) for all ε . For
ε sufficiently small Φi(g,P,C1) 6= Φi(g,P,D1) because Φ is continuous in cost structures.
Without loss of generality suppose Φi(g,P,C1)>Φi(g,P,D1). Let δ¯ ∈ [0,1] be defined by
δ¯ = max{δ∈[0,1] |Φi(g,P,(1−δ )C1+δD1) =Φi(g,P,C1)}.
Then δ¯ < 1 and φi(g,P,(1− δ )C1 + δD1) < φi(g,P,C1) for all δ ∈]δ¯ ,1]. For the connec-
tion problem (P,(1− δ¯ )C1 + δ¯D1) if all agents except agent i are telling the truth, then
the strategy (ωi,σi), where ωi = (ai,bi) and σi is such that for some δ ∈]δ¯ ,1] and all jk,
τ(σ jki ,(c jk)i′ 6=i) = (1− δ )c1jk + δd1jk lowers the cost share of agent i. There exists σ i such
that for some δ ∈]δ¯ ,1] and all jk, τ(σ jki ,(c jk)i′ 6=i) = (1−δ )c1jk +δd1jk because τ is contin-
uous and sensitive. 2
Misreporting connection costs influences cost estimates and cost estimates influence the
set of estimated MCCNs. Moreover if an allocation rule does not satisfy NI, then cost
shares depend on the selected MCCN. Therefore agents can manipulate their cost shares by
misreporting provided NI is not satisfied. Furthermore misreporting need not be revealed
because true connection costs of unused connections are unobserved.
Observation 2 Suppose Φ is continuous in cost structures and τ is continuous and upward
or downward sensitive. If truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium, then Φ satisfies NI.
Proof: Suppose a cost allocation rule Φ does not satisfy NI. Then there is a connection
problem (P,C) and an agent i such that
min
g∈MCCN (P,C)
Φi(g,P,C) < max
h∈MCCN (P,C)
Φi(h,P,C).
Therefore supposeΦi(g,P,C)≤Φi(h,P,C) for g and i and all h∈MCCN (P,C) andΦi(g,P,C)<
Φi(h′,P,C) for g and i and some h′ ∈MCCN (P,C). For ε > 0 define another cost structure
C1 by
c1jk =
{
c jk for jk ∈ g
c jk + ε for all other connections
Then g is the unique MCCN for connection problem (P,C1) for all ε . For ε sufficiently
small
Φi(g,P,C1) <
1
|MCCN (P,C)| ∑h∈MCCN (P,C)
Φi(h,P,C)
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because Φ is continuous in cost structures. For the connection problem (P,C) if all agents
except agent i are telling the truth, then the strategy (ωi,σi), where ωi = (ai,bi) and σi
is such that τ(σ jki ,(c jk)i′ 6=i) = c
1
jk, lowers the expected cost share of agent i. There exist
ε > 0 and σi such that τ(σ jki ,(c jk)i′ 6=i) = c
1
jk because τ is continuous and upward sensitive.
Hence truth-telling is not an equilibrium for (P,C). Alternative, there exist ε > 0 and σi
such that τ(σ jki ,(c jk)i′ 6=i) = c jk− ε for jk ∈ g and τ(σ jki ,(c jk)i′ 6=i) = c jk for jk /∈ g because
τ is continuous and downward sensitive. 2
Truth-telling
Both UII and NI are necessary for truthful reporting as shown in Observations 1 and 2.
Consequently we focus on simple allocation rules.
Definition 6 An allocation rule Φ is implementable provided truth-telling is a Nash equi-
librium for every connection problem (P,C) ∈U .
Let P−i = (ai′,bi′)i′ 6=i be a collection of connection demands for all agents except agent
i. Then a simple allocation rule is implementable if and only if it is increasing in total costs
and the cost share of every agent is independent of her connection demand.
Theorem 2 Suppose an allocation rule Φ is simple and an estimation rule τ is continuous
and sensitive. Then truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium if and only if γ is increasing in total
costs and γi((ai,bi),P−i,N ,v) = γi((αi,βi),P−i,N ,v) for all i, P−i, (ai,bi), (αi,βi) and v.
Proof: It is left to the reader to check that if γ is increasing in v and γ((ai,bi),P−i,N ,v) =
γ((αi,βi),P−i,N ,v) for all i, P−i, (ai,bi), (αi,βi) and v, then truth-telling is a Nash equilib-
rium.
Suppose γ is not increasing in v. Then there are P, vL,vH with vH > vL and i such that
γi(P,N ,vH) < γi(P,N ,vL). Therefore for all ε > 0 there is vε such that γi(P,N , ·) is not
increasing in v ∈ [vε − ε,vε + ε]∩ [vL,vH ]. Let v¯ ∈ [vL,vH ] be an accumulation point for
(vε)ε>0. Then for all ε > 0 there are v′,v′′ ∈ [v¯− ε, v¯+ ε]∩ [vL,vH ] such that v′ > v′′ and
γi(P,N ,v′)< γi(P,N ,v′′). Hence for all ε > 0 there are v′,v′′ ∈ [v¯−ε, v¯+ε]∩ [vL,vH ] such
that v′ ≥ v¯ ≥ v′′ and γ(P,N ,v′) < γ(P,N , v¯) or γ(P,N ,v′′) > γ(P,N , v¯). Hence there
is a sequence (vn)n∈N with vn ∈ [vL,vH ] and limn→∞ vn = v¯ such that vn > v¯ for all n and
γ(P,N ,vn)< γ(P,N , v¯) for all n or vn < v¯ for all n and γ(P,N ,vn)> γ(P,N , v¯) for all n.
Let g be a CN minimizing the number of connections |g|. For some rs ∈ g let gr (gs)
be the component containing r (s) of g without rs. For vnmin = min{vn, v¯} and vnmax =
max{vn, v¯} for all n let a sequence of connection costs (cn)n∈N be defined as follows: (1)
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cnjk = (1/|g|)vnmin for all jk ∈ g; (2.1) in case gr = gs = /0 pick a location t 6= r,s and add rt
and st to g without rs with location costs cnrt = c
n
st = (1/|g|)vnmin/2+(vnmax−vnmin)/2; (2.2)
in case gr = /0 and gs 6= /0 pick a location t 6= s in gs and add rt to g without rs with connection
cost cnrt = (1/|g|)vnmin+(vnmax− vnmin); (2.3) in case gr 6= /0 and gs = /0 pick a location t 6= r
in gr and add st to g without rs with connection cost cnst = (1/|g|)vnmin + (vnmax− vnmin);
(2.4) in case gr,gs 6= /0 pick locations t 6= r in gr and u 6= s in gs with connection cost
cntu = (1/|g|)vnmin+(vnmax−vnmin); and, (3) let cnjk = vnmax for all other connections jk. Then
g is the unique MCCN with v(g,cn) = vnmin for all n and there is a unique CN with no
redundant connections h with v(h,cn) = vnmax.
For the connection problem (P,Cn) if all agents except agent i are telling the truth, then
the strategy (ωi,σi), where ωi = (ai,bi) and σi is such that τ(σ jki ,(c jk)i′ 6=i) = c
n
jk for all
jk ∈ h and τ(σ jki ,(c jk)i′ 6=i) = cnjk+εn for all jk /∈ h, lowers the expected cost share of agent
i for εn = 2(vnmax− vnmin). There is n ∈ N and σi such that τ(σ
jk
i ,(c jk)i′ 6=i) = c
n
jk for all
jk ∈ h and τ(σ jki ,(c jk)i′ 6=i) = cnjk + εn for all jk /∈ h because τ is continuous and sensitive.
Hence truth-telling is not an equilibrium for (P,Cn) for some n.
Suppose γi((ai,bi),P−i,N ,v) > γi((αi,βi),P−i,N ,v) for some i, P−i, (ai,bi), (αi,βi)
and v > 0. Consider connection costs c such that for some i′ 6= i a path between ai′ and bi′
going through all locations is the unique MCCN and the cost of the path is v. Suppose the
true connection structure is ((ai,bi),P−i). Then agent i can lower her cost share by changing
her strategy from (ai,bi) to (αi,βi). Therefore truth-telling is not a Nash equilibrium. 2
Recall that the price of stability PS(Φ,τ)≥ 1 is the ratio between the cost of the cheapest
Nash equilibrium and the cost of a MCCN
PS(Φ,τ) = sup
(g,P,C)∈U
inf
(ω,σ)∈NE (P,C,Φ,τ)
∑i EΦi(ω,c,ce(σ))
v(g,c)
.
Theorem 2 implies the price of stability is one provided the allocation rule is simple and
satisfies the assumption in the theorem.
If an allocation rule is simple and increasing in total cost, then it is continuous in total
costs.
Observation 3 Suppose an allocation rule Φ is simple and γ is increasing in total costs.
Then γ is continuous in total costs.
Proof: Suppose γ is not continuous in v. Then there are P, v¯> 0 and (vn)n∈N with limn→∞ vn =
v such that liminfn→∞ γi(P,N ,vn) 6= γ(P,N , v¯) or limsupn→∞ γi(P,N ,vn) 6= γ(P,N , v¯).
By considering a subsequence it can be assumed that vn < v¯ for all n or vn > v¯ for all
n. In case vn < v¯ for all n, liminfn→∞ γi(P,N ,vn) < γi(P,N , v¯) because γi is increas-
ing in total costs. Since ∑i∈M γi(P,N ,v) = v for all P and v, there is i′ and n such that
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γi′(P,N ,vn) > γi′(P,N , v¯) contradicting γi′ is increasing in total costs. In case vn > v¯ for
all n, limsupn→∞ γi(P,N ,vn) > γi(P,N , v¯) because γi is increasing in total costs. Since
∑i∈M γi(P,N ,v) = v for all P and v, there is i′ and n such that γi′(P,N ,vn) < γi′(P,N , v¯)
contradicting γi′ is increasing in total costs. 2
A linear simple allocation rule is implementable if and only if the cost share of every
agent is independent of her connection demand.
Corollary 4 Suppose an allocation rule Φ is linear simple. Then truth-telling is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if Γi((ai,bi),P−i,N ) = Γi((αi,βi),P−i,N ) for all i, P−i, (ai,bi)
and (αi,βi).
Proof: It is left to the reader to check that if Γi((ai,bi),P−i,N ) = Γi((αi,βi),P−i,N ) for
all i, P−i, (ai,bi) and (αi,βi), then truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose Γi((ai,bi),P−i,N )>Γi((αi,βi),P−i,N ) for some i, P−i, (ai,bi), (αi,βi). Con-
sider connection costs c such that for some i′ 6= i a path between ai′ and bi′ going through all
locations is the unique MCCN. Suppose the true connection structure is ((ai,bi),P−i). Then
agent i can lower her cost share by changing her strategy from (ai,bi) to (αi,βi). Therefore
truth-telling is not a Nash equilibrium. 2
A less ignorant planner
We consider the consequences of: connection demands being known by the planner; and,
connection costs being known by the planner.
Theorem 3 Consider the set of connection problems (P,C).
(1) Assume connection demands are known by the planner. For all connection prob-
lems (P,C) and all rules of the game (Φ,τ), where Φ is simple and τ is downward or
upward unbounded,
MCCN (P,Ce(σ¯)) ⊂ MCCN (P,C)
for all σ¯ ∈NE (P,C,Φ,τ).
(2) Assume connection costs are known by the planner. There are connection problems
(P,C) such that for all rules of the game (Φ,τ), where Φ is simple,
MCCN (Pe(ω¯),C)∩MCCN (P,C) = /0
for some ω¯ ∈NE (P,C,Φ,τ).
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Proof: “Known connection demands” Suppose
MCCN (P,Ce(σ¯)) 6⊂ MCCN (P,C).
Then there is CN g with g ∈MCCN (P,Ce(σ¯)) and g /∈MCCN (P,C) so v(g,c) > v(h,c)
for all h ∈MCCN (P,C). Therefore there is an agent i such that
1
|MCCN (P,Ce(σ¯))| ∑g∈MCCN (P,Ce(σ¯))
φi(g,P,C) >
1
|MCCN (P,C)| ∑h∈MCCN (P,C)
φi(h,P,C)
because v(g,c)≥ v(h,c) for all g ∈MCCN (P,Ce(σ¯)) and h ∈MCCN (P,C).
If τ is downward unbounded there is a sequence of strategies (σin)n∈N for agent i such
that limn→∞ τ(σ jkin , σ¯
jk
−i) = 0 for some h ∈MCCN (P,C) and all jk ∈ h. If τ is upward
unbounded there is a sequence of strategies (σin)n∈N such that limn→∞ τ(σ
jk
in , σ¯
jk
−i) = ∞ for
some h ∈MCCN (P,C) and all jk /∈ h. Thus σ¯ is not a Nash equilibrium.
“Known connection costs” Consider an example with four agents i ∈ {1,2,3,4} and four
locations j ∈ {1,2,3,4}. Suppose the connection demands are (ai,bi) = (2,3) for all i and
the cost structure is c23 = 1, c12 = c34 = ε and c jk = 1+ ε for all other jk /∈ {12,23,34}
where ε > 0. Then the unique MCCN is g = 23 with v(g,c) = 1. Let the allocation rule
be any simple allocation rule satisfying the assumption in Theorem 2. Suppose agents i ∈
{1,2} reports their connection demands as (αi,βi) = (1,3) and agents i∈ {3,4} reports their
connection demands as (αi,βi) = (2,4). Based on the reports the network h = 12,23,34 is
selected with v(h,c) = 1+2ε . Moreover it is not possible for any of the four agents to bring
down her cost share by changing her report. 2
Recall that the price of anarchy PA(Φ,τ) ≥ 1 is the ratio between the cost of the most
expensive Nash equilibrium and the cost of a MCCN
PS(Φ,τ) = sup
(g,P,C)∈U
sup
(ω,σ)∈NE (P,C,Φ,τ)
∑i EΦi(ω,c,ce(σ))
v(g,c)
.
In case connection demands are known as in (1) in Theorem 3 and the allocation rule is
increasing in total cost ensuring existence of Nash equilibria according to Theorem 2, the
price of anarchy drops to 1. In case connection costs are known as in (2) in Theorem 3 and
the cost share of every agent is independent of her connection demand ensuring existence
of Nash equilibria according to Theorem 2, the price of anarchy is unbounded. Indeed the
proof of (2) in Theorem 3 is an example where the cost of anarchy is 1+2ε where ε > 0 is
arbitrary.
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5 Implementation with incomplete information
For every agent, information about connection costs and connection demands of other agents
can be incomplete: for example, they know their own connection demand and connection
costs but only have vague ideas about connection costs and connection demands of oth-
ers. As discussed in Jackson (1991) incomplete information is naturally modeled within a
Bayesian setting.
All agents and the planner know the set of finitely many locations N ⊂L . For agent
i let Pi ⊂ N ×N be a set of possible connection demands. Let P = ∏iPi. Let C =
{C1, . . . ,C`} be a finite set of possible cost structures known by all agents. Every agent i
has a probability measure on the set of states µi :P×C → [0,1] with µi(P,C) > 0 for all
(P,C) ∈P×C . In addition every agent i has a signal from the set of possible states to
subsets of that set δi :P×C → 2P×C where δi(P,C) is the private information of agent i
at (P,C). For signals it is assumed that: (1) every agent knows her own connection demand;
(2) if the state is (P,C), then (P,C) is part of the private information at (P,C); (3) (P′,C′) is
part of the private information at (P,C) if and only if (P,C) is part of the private information
at (P′,C′); and, (4) the intersection of all private information sets consists of the true state.
Formally: (1) prPiδi(P,C)= (ai,bi) for P=(ai′,bi′)i′ where prPi is the projection onPi; (2)
(P,C) ∈ δi(P,C); 3. (P,C) ∈ δi(P′,C′) if and only if (P′,C′) ∈ δi(P,C); and 4. ∩iδi(P,C) =
(P,C).
A connection problem with incomplete information consists of a set of agents, a set of
possible states and a list of individual signals and probability measures, (N ,P×C ,(δi,µi)i).
The planner is ignorant in the sense that she knows neither the set of possible states nor the
individual lists of signals and probablility measures.
Let K be the set of all cost structures so C⊂K . Let F be the set of all finite subsets
of K . The planner chooses a mechanism that consists of an announcement set for every
agent, a cost allocation rule and an estimation rule. The announcement set of agent i is
F×(N ×N )
so agent announces a finite set of cost structures and, a connnection demand for herself. Let
Ai be announcement of agent i. The cost allocation rule is a map φ :U → Rm+. The estima-
tion rule is a map Ce :∏i prK Ai→K where Ce(∏i prK Ai)∈ co(∩iprK Ai) for∩iprK Ai 6= /0
with co(·) being the convex hull operator. Therefore if everybody is telling the truth, then
the estimated cost structure is the true cost structure because ∩iδi(P,C) = (P,C). Moreover
the estimation rule is supposed to be sensitive in the sense that
cejk(Ki,∏i′ 6=iKi′) > cejk(K
′
i ,∏i′ 6=iKi′)
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for allKi andK ′i with minK∈Ki k jk >minK∈K ′i k jk and maxK∈Ki k jk >maxK∈K ′i k jk.
For a list of individual announcements A = (Ai), let P(A) = (prN ×N Ai)i be the list
of individual announcements of connection demands. If the state is (P,C) and the list of
individual announcements is (Ai)i, then average cost of agent i is
∑
g∈MCCN (P(A),Ce(∏i prK Ai))
1
|MCCN (P(A),Ce(∏i prK Ai)|
φi(g,P(A),C)
and the expected cost of agent i is
∑
s∈δi(P,C)
µi(s)
∑s′∈δi(P,C)µi(s′)
∑
g∈MCCN (P(s),Ce(∏i′ prK si′))
φi(g,P(A),Ce(∏
i′
prK si′)).
For a cost allocation problem with incomplete information a strategy for agent i is a map
from the set of states to the set of announcements
fi :P×C →F×(N ×N )
that is measurable with respect to δi so fi(s) = fi(s′) provided δi(s) = δi(s′). A Bayesian
Nash equilibrium is a list of individual strategies such that no agent can lower her expected
cost.
Corollary 5 Suppose an allocation rule is simple and an estimation rule is continuous and
sensitive. Then truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if γ is increasing
in total costs and γi((ai,bi),P−i,N ,v) = γi((αi,βi),P−i,N ,v) for all i, P−i, (ai,bi), (αi,βi)
and v.
Proof: Assume γ is increasing in total cost and γi((ai,bi),P−i,N ,v) = γi((αi,βi),P−i,N ,v)
for all i, P−i, (ai,bi), (αi,βi) and v. Suppose that all agents use truth-telling as strategies.
Then the planner uses the true connection structure and cost structure so the planner selects
a MCCN. Therefore no agent can lower her expected cost by deviating.
Assume γ is not increasing in total cost or γi((ai,bi),P−i,N ,v) 6= γi((αi,βi),P−i,N ,v)
for some i, P−i, (ai,bi), (αi,βi) and v. Since complete information is a special case of
incomplete information, it follows from the proof of Theorem 2 that there exists a connection
problem with complete information (C,P) for which truth-telling is not a Nash equilibrium.
Moreover there exists ε > 0 such that for connection problems with incomplete information,
if max{|C1−C|, . . . , |C`−C|}< ε and µi(P′,C′)< ε for all i and (P′,C′) with P′ 6= P, then
some agent can benefit by making false announcements. 2
In Hougaard and Tvede (2012) we provide an example of the MCST model with incom-
plete information where there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium resulting in a network that is
not a MCCN. In the MCST model connection demands are known. Therefore the example
shows that (1) in Theorem 3 does not generalize from complete information to incomplete
information.
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6 The German Hansa
To emphasize that the CN model has broad relevance we use the German Hansa as an il-
lustrative example of network building and cost allocation in practice. A thorough study of
the Hansa is found in Dollinger (1970). The Hansa started in the middle of the 12th century
as an association of north German merchants, developed into a community of cities in the
middle of the 14th century and dissolved in the middle of the 17th century. The Hansa was
used for obtaining trading privileges for its mechants as well as protecting and supporting
its merchants. Most of the trade involving merchants with Hanseatic trading privileges took
place in the area between Novgorod in east and London in west and Cologne in south and
Bergen in north. The Hansa is an example of a network with locations being towns whose
merchants had Hanseatic privileges and their marketplaces and connections being roads be-
tween towns and markets.
In the middle of the 12th century north German merchants regularly visiting or perma-
nently settling in Gotland formed a community. These merchants wanted to take advan-
tage of commercial oppotunities in Russia in Novgorod as well as in Polotsk, Vitebsk and
Smolensk on the river Dvina. However pagan habitants of Finland and the Baltic countries
made trade very risky. Around 1200 bishop Albert led a crusade into the Baltic countries.
The Gotland community contributed to the crusade by equipping hundreds of crusaders and
providing transportation. Lu¨beck supported the crusade. In 1241 Hamburg and Lu¨beck
agreed to share the cost of keeping the roads between the two towns free from brigands.
Both the crusade and the fight against brigandage can be seen as establishing new connec-
tions and establishing these connections can be seen as a public good for merchants with
Hanseatic privileges as well as (almost) everybody else.
The German Hansa lived with the tension between Individual Rationality and truthful
implementation. In 1284 the Norwegian king restricted the Hanseatic privileges. The Hansa
responded with a blockade. Bremen did not participate in the blockade because being part of
the blockade would have favoured Baltic towns trading with Norway. The Hansa punished
Bremen by exclusion. The behaviour of Bremen can be interpreted as an attempt to free ride:
if the blockade failed, Bremen could continue to trade with Norway; and, if the blockade
succeeded, Bremen could benefit from the improved Hanseatic privileges. The Hansa and
Denmark were at war from 1367 to 1369 when Denmark asked for peace. The Westphalian
towns including Cologne traded mainly with England and the low countries. These towns
did not contribute or support the war, but the Hansa did not exclude them. The lack of
support from the Westphalian towns simply reflected their lack of commercial interests in
the war.
The German Hansa could sanction participants by use of fines, confiscation and exclu-
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sion, but as mentioned earlier participation was voluntarily. Based on the difference between
how Bremen and the Westphalian towns were treated it appears the Hansa dealt with the in-
compatibility of voluntary participation and truthful implementation by accepting that cost
shares should depend on commercial interests or connection demands in the CN model.
Since merchants from different towns met at marketplaces they probably knew the commer-
cial interests of each other. Therefore (1) in Theorem 3 rather than Theorem 2 describes
the relevant situation with the planner being the German Hansa. Hence the German Hansa
could let cost shares depend on commercial interests such that towns with no commercial
interest would not have to contribute and towns with commercial interests would have to
contribute or face sanctions.
7 Final remarks
Extensions: Using the idea of routing-proofness from Moulin (2014) every agent i could
misrepresent her connection demand by splitting into mi aliases who each reports a connec-
tion demand. The characterization in Theorem 2 of allocation rules that truthfully imple-
ments MCCNs remains valid provided the condition in Theorem 2 is modified to
γi((ai,bi),P−i,N ,v) ≤
mi
∑
k=1
γik((αi`,βi`)mi`=1,P−i,N ,v).
The connection demand of every agent i could consist of mi pairs of locations (aki ,b
k
i )
mi
k=1
rather than a single pair (ai,bi). The characterizations in Theorem 1 and Corollaries 2-4 of
allocation rules as well as the characterizations in Theorem 2 and Corollary 4 of allocation
rules that truthfully implements MCCNs remain valid. Indeed our proofs of Theorems 1 and
2 and Corollaries 1-4 remain valid without any changes.
Summing up: For the CN model with undemanded locations: we have characterized alloca-
tion rules satisfying UII or SUII and NI as well as UII or SUII, NI and SI; we have shown
that if an allocation rule implements MCCNs truthfully, then it satisfies UII and NI; and,
we have characterized allocation rules satisfying UII and NI and truthfully implementing
MCCNs. To our surprise it turned out that an allocation rule satisfies UII and NI if and only
if relative cost shares depend on connection demands and nothing else. Consequently vol-
untarily participation is at odds with Individual Rationality in the CN model in contrast to
the MCST model. Therefore economic efficiency can be attained if and only if the planner
is able to prevent agents from building their own networks.
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